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1 Introduction
The goal of dependence logic is to establish a basic theory of dependence and
independence underlying such seemingly unrelated subjects as causality, random
variables, bound variables in logic, database theory, the theory of social choice,
and even quantum physics. There is an avalanche of new results in this field
demonstrating remarkable convergence. The concepts of (in)dependence in the
different fields of humanities and sciences have surprisingly much in common
and a common logic is starting to emerge.
Dependence logic [23] arose from the compositional semantics of Wilfrid
Hodges [14] for the independence friendly logic [13, 19]. In dependence logic
the basic semantic concept is not that of an assignment s satisfying a formula φ in
∗Research partially supported by the EUROCORES LogICCC LINT programme, by the
Va¨isa¨la¨ Foundation and by by Grant 264917 of the Academy of Finland.
†Research partially supported by grant 40734 of the Academy of Finland and the EURO-
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a model M,
M |=s φ,
as in first order logic, but rather the concept of a set S of assignments satisfying φ
in M,
M |=S φ.
Defining satisfaction relative to a set of assignments opens up the possibility to
express dependence phenomena, roughly as passing in propositional logic from
one valuation to a Kripke model leads to the possibility to express modality. The
focus in dependence logic is not on truth values but on variable values. We are
interested in dependencies between individuals rather than between propositions.
In [24] Johan van Benthem writes:
“Sets of assignments S encode several kinds of ‘dependence’
between variables. There may not be one single intuition.
‘Dependence’ may mean functional dependence
(if two assignments agree in S on x, they also agree on y),
but also other kinds of ‘correlation’ among value ranges.
...
Different dependence relations may have different mathematical
properties and suggest different logical formalisms.”
(1)
This is actually how things have turned out. For a start, using the concept of func-
tional dependence it is possible, as Wilfrid Hodges [14] demonstrated, to define
compositionally1 the semantics of independence friendly logic, the extension of
first order logic by the quantifier
∃x/yφ i.e. “there is an x, independently of y, such that φ”,
as follows: Suppose S is a team of assignments, a “plural state”, in a model M.
Then
M |=S ∃x/yφ
if and only if there is another set S ′ such that
M |=S′ φ
and the following “transition”-conditions hold:
1Before [14] it was an open question whether a compositional semantics can be given to inde-
pendence friendly logic.
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• If s ∈ S, then there is s′ ∈ S ′ such that if z is a variable other than x, then
s(z) = s′(z).
• If s′ ∈ S ′, then there is s ∈ S such that if z is a variable other than x, then
s(z) = s′(z).
• If s, s′ ∈ S ′ and s(z) = s′(z) for all variables other than y or x, then
s(x) = s′(x).
In a sense, independence friendly logic is a logical formalism suggested by the
functional dependence relation, but its origin is in game theoretical semantics,
not in dependence relations. With dependence logic the situation is different. It
was directly inspired by the functional dependence relation introduced by Wilfrid
Hodges.
Peter van Emde Boas pointed out to the second author in the fall of 2005 that
the functional dependence behind dependence logic is known in database theory
[2]. This led the second author to realize—eventually—that the dependence we
are talking about here is not just about variables in logic but a much more general
phenomenon, covering such diverse areas as algebra, statistics, computer science,
medicine, biology, social science, etc.
As Johan van Benthem points out in (1), there are different dependence intu-
itions. Of course the same is true of intuitions about independence. For some time
it was not clear what would be the most natural concept of independence. There
was the obvious but rather weak form of independence of x from y as dependence
of x on some variable z other than y. Eventually a strong form of independence
was introduced in [10], which has led to a breakthrough in our understanding of
dependence relations and their role.
We give an overview of some developments in dependence logic (Section 2)
and independence logic (Section 3). This is a tiny selection, intended for a new-
comer, from a rapidly growing literature on the topic. Furthermore, in Section 4
we discuss conditional independence atoms and we prove a novel result – that is,
that conditional and non-conditional independence logic are equivalent. Finally,
in Section 5 we briefly discuss an application of our logics to belief representation.
2 Functional dependence
The approach of [23] is that one should look for the strongest concept of depen-
dence and use it to define weaker versions. Conceivably one could do the oppo-
site, start from the weakest and use it to define stronger and strong concepts. The
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weakest dependence concept—whatever it is—did not offer itself immediately, so
the strongest was more natural to start with. The wisdom of focusing in the ex-
tremes lies in the hope that the extremes are most likely to manifest simplicity and
robustness, which would make them susceptible to a theoretical study.
Let us start with the strongest form of dependence, functional dependence. We
use the vector notation ~x for finite sequences x1, . . . , xn of variables2. We add to
first order logic3 new atomic formulas
=(~y, ~x), (2)
with the intuitive meaning
“the ~y totally determine the ~x.
In other words, the meaning of (2) is that the values of the variables ~y functionally
determine the values of the variables ~x. We think of the atomic formulas (2) on
a par with the atomic formula x = y. In particular, the idea is that the formula
(2) is a purely logical expression, not involving any non-logical symbols, in par-
ticular no function symbol for the purported function manifesting the functional
dependence.
The best way to understand the concept (2) is to give it exact semantics: To
this end, suppose M is a model. Suppose S is a set of assignments into M (or a
team as such sets are called). We define:
Definition 1. The team S satisfies =(~y, ~x) in M, in symbols
M |=S =(~y, ~x)
if
∀s, s′ ∈ S(s(~y) = s′(~y)→ s(~x) = s′(~x)). (3)
One may ask, why not define the meaning of =(y, x) as “there is a function
which maps y to x”? The answer is that if we look at the meaning of =(y, x) under
one assignment s, then there always is a function f mapping s(y) to s(x), namely
the function {(s(y), s(x))}, and if we look at the meaning of =(y, x) under many
assignments, a team, then (3) is indeed equivalent to the statement that there is a
function mapping s(y) to s(x) for all s in the team.
2Or attributes, something that has a value.
3The basic ideas can be applied to almost any logic, especially to modal logic.
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A special case of =(~y, ~x) is =(~x), the constancy atom. The intuitive meaning
of this atom is that the value of ~x is constant in the team. It results from =(~y, ~x)
when ~y is the empty sequence.
Functional dependence has been studied in database theory and some basic
properties, called Armstrong’s Axioms have been isolated [2]. These axioms
state the following properties of =(~y, ~x):
(A1) =(~x, ~x). Anything is functionally dependent of itself.
(A2) If =(~y, ~x) and ~y ⊆ ~z, then =(~z, ~x). Functional dependence is preserved by
increasing input data.
(A3) If ~y is a permutation of ~z, ~u is a permutation of ~x, and =(~z, ~x), then =(~y, ~u).
Functional dependence does not look at the order of the variables.
(A4) If =(~y, ~z) and =(~z, ~x), then =(~y, ~x). Functional dependences can be transi-
tively composed.
The following result is well-known in the database community and included
in textbooks of database theory:4
Theorem 2 ([2]). The axioms (A1)-(A4) are complete in the sense that a relation
=(~x, ~y) follows by the rules (A1)-(A4) from a set Σ of relations of the same form
if and only if every team which satisfies Σ satisfies =(~y, ~x).
Proof. Suppose =(~y, ~x) does not follow by the rules from a set Σ of atoms. Let V
be the set of variables z such that =(~y, z) follows by the rules from Σ. Let W be
the remaining variables in Σ ∪ {=(~y, ~x)}. Thus ~x ∩W 6= ∅. Consider the model
{0, 1} of the empty vocabulary and the team
The variables in V The variables in W
0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0 1 1 . . . 1
The atom =(~y, ~x) is not true in this team, because ~y ⊆ V and ~x∩W 6= ∅. Suppose
then =(~v, ~w) is one of the assumptions. If each v is in V , then so is each w so
they all get value 0. On the other hand, if some v is in W , it gets in this team two
values, so it cannot violate dependence.
4See e.g. [20].
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We now extend the truth definition (1) to the full first order logic augmented
by the dependence atoms =(~x, ~y). To this end, let s(a/x) denote the assignment
which agrees with s except that it gives x the value a. We define for formulas
which have negation in front of atomic formulas only:
M |=S x = y ⇐⇒ ∀s ∈ S(s(x) = s(y)).
M |=S ¬x = y ⇐⇒ ∀s ∈ S(s(x) 6= s(y)).
M |=S R(x1, . . . , xn) ⇐⇒ ∀s ∈ S((s(x1), . . . , s(xn)) ∈ R
M).
M |=S ¬R(x1, . . . , xn) ⇐⇒ ∀s ∈ S((s(x1), . . . , s(xn)) /∈ R
M).
M |=S φ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M |=S φ and M |=S ψ.
M |=S φ ∨ ψ ⇐⇒ There are S1 and S2 such that
S = S1 ∪ S2, M |=S1 φ, and M |=S2 ψ.
M |=S ∃xφ ⇐⇒ M |=S′ φ for some S′ such that
∀s ∈ S ∃a ∈M(s(a/x) ∈ S′)
M |=S ∀xφ ⇐⇒ M |=S′ φ for some S′ such that
∀s ∈ S ∀a ∈M(s(a/x) ∈ S′)


(4)
It is easy to see that for formulas not containing any dependence atoms, that
is, for pure first order formulas φ,
M |={s} φ ⇐⇒ M |=s φ
and
M |=S φ ⇐⇒ ∀s ∈ S(M |=s φ),
where M |=s φ has its usual meaning. This shows that the truth conditions (4)
agree with the usual Tarski truth conditions for first order formulas. Thus con-
sidering the “plural state” S rather than individual “states” s makes no difference
for first order logic, but it makes it possible to give the dependence atoms =(~x, ~y)
their intended meaning.
What about axioms for non-atomic formulas of dependence logic? Should
we adopt new axioms, apart from the Armstrong Axioms [A1-A4]? There is a
problem! Consider the sentence
∃x∀y∃z(=(z, y) ∧ ¬z = x). (5)
It is easy to see that this sentence is satisfied by a team in a model M if and
only M is infinite. As a result, by general considerations going back to Go¨del’s
Incompleteness Theorem, the semantic consequence relation
φ |= ψ ⇐⇒ ∀M∀S(M |=S φ→M |=S ψ)
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is non-arithmetical. Thus there cannot be any completeness theorem in the usual
sense. However, this does not prevent us from trying to find axioms and rules
which are as complete as possible. This is what is done in [18], where a com-
plete axiomatization is given for first order consequences of dependence logic
sentences. The axioms are a little weaker than standard first order axioms when
applied to dependence formulas, but on the other hand there are two special ax-
ioms for the purpose of dealing with dependence atoms as parts of formulas in a
deduction. Rather than giving all details (which can be found in [18]) we give just
an example of the use of both new rules.
Suppose we are given ǫ, x, y and f , and we have already concluded, in the
middle of some argument, the following:
If ǫ > 0, then there is δ > 0 depending only on ǫ such that
if |x− y| < δ, then |f(x)− f(y)| < ǫ.
By merely logical reasons we should be able to conclude
There is δ > 0 depending only on ǫ such that
if ǫ > 0 and |x− y| < δ, then |f(x)− f(y)| < ǫ.
Note that “depending only on ǫ” has moved from inside the implication to outside
of it. The new rule of dependence logic, isolated in [18], which permits this, is
called Dependence Distribution Rule. Neither first order rules nor Armstrong’s
Axioms give this because neither of them gives any clue of how to deal with
dependence atoms as parts of bigger formulas.
Here is another example of inference in dependence logic: Suppose we have
arrived at the following formula in the middle of some argument:
For every x and every ǫ > 0 there is δ > 0 depending only on ǫ
such that for all y, if |x− y| < δ, then |f(x)− f(y)| < ǫ.
On merely logical grounds we should be able to make the following conclusion:
For every x and every ǫ > 0 there is δ > 0
such that for all y, if |x− y| < δ, then |f(x)− f(y)| < ǫ,
and moreover, for any other x′ and ǫ′ > 0 there is δ′ > 0
such that for all y′, if |x′ − y′| < δ′, then |f(x′)− f(y′)| < ǫ
and if ǫ = ǫ′, then δ = δ′.
7
The new rule, isolated in [18] which permits this step is called Dependence Elim-
ination Rule, because the dependence atom “depending only on ǫ” has been en-
tirely eliminated. The conclusion is actually first order, that is, without any occur-
rence of dependence atoms.
The first author [7] has given an alternative complete axiomatization, not for
first order consequences of dependence sentences, but for dependence logic con-
sequences of first order sentences. Clearly, more results about partial axiomatiza-
tions of the logical consequence relation in dependence logic can be expected in
the near future.
An important property of dependence logic is the downward closure [15]: If
M |=S φ and S ′ ⊆ S, then M |=S′ φ. It is a trivial matter to prove this by in-
duction on the length of the formula. Once the downward closure is established it
is obvious that we are far from having a negation in the sense of classical logic.
Intuitively, dependence is a restriction of freedom (of values of variables in as-
signments). When the team gets smaller there is even less freedom. This intuition
about the nature of dependence prevails in all the logical operations of dependence
logic. Since dependence formulas are easily seen to be representable in existential
second order logic, the following result shows that downward closure is really the
essential feature of dependence logic:
Theorem 3 ([17]). Let us fix a vocabulary L and an n-ary predicate symbol S /∈
L. Then:
• For every L-formula φ(x1, ..., xn) of dependence logic there is an existential
second order L ∪ {S}-sentence Φ(S), closed downward with respect to S,
such that for all L-structures M and all teams X:
M |=X φ(x1, ..., xn) ⇐⇒ M |= Φ(X). (6)
• For every existential second orderL∪{S}-sentence Φ(S), closed downward
with respect to S, there exists an L-formula φ(x1, ..., xn) of dependence
logic such that (6) holds for all L-structures M and all teams X 6= ∅.
This shows that dependence logic is maximal with respect to the properties of
being expressible in existential second order logic and being downward closed.
This theorem is also the source of the main model theoretical properties of de-
pendence logic. The Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem, the Compactness
Theorem and the Interpolation Theorem are immediate corollaries. Also, when
the above theorem is combined with the Interpolation Theorem of first order logic,
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we get the fact that dependence logic sentences φ for which there exists a depen-
dence logic sentence ψ such that for all M
M |= ψ ⇐⇒ M 6|= φ
are first order definable. So not only does dependence logic not have the classi-
cal negation, the only sentences that have a classical negation are the first order
sentences.
3 Independence logic
Independence logic was introduced in [10]. Before going into the details, let us
look at the following precedent:
In [24] Johan van Benthem suggested, as an example of an “other kind of
correlation” than functional dependence, the following dependence relation for a
team S in a model M:
∃a ∈M∃b ∈M({s(x) : s ∈ S, s(y) = a} 6= {s(x) : s ∈ S, s(y) = b}). (7)
The opposite of this would be
∀a ∈M∀b ∈M({s(x) : s ∈ S, s(y) = a} = {s(x) : s ∈ S, s(y) = b}), (8)
which is a kind of independence of x from y, for if we take s ∈ S and we are told
what s(y) is, we have learnt nothing about s(x), because for each a ∈M the set
{s(x) : s ∈ S, s(y) = a}
is the same. This is the idea behind the independence atom ~x ⊥ ~y: the values of
~x should not reveal anything about the values of ~y and vice versa. More exactly,
suppose M is a model and S is a team of assignments into M . We define:
Definition 4. A team S satisfies the atomic formula ~x ⊥ ~y in M if
∀s, s′ ∈ S∃s′′ ∈ S(s′′(~y) = s(~y) ∧ s′′(~x) = s′(~x)). (9)
We can immediately observe that a constant variable is independent of every
variable, including itself. To see this, suppose x is constant in S. Let y be any
variable, possibly y = x. If s, s′ ∈ S are given, we need s′′ ∈ S such that s′′(x) =
s(x) and s′′(y) = s′(y). We can simply take s′′ = s′. Now s′′(x) = s(x), because
9
x is constant in S. Of course, s′′(y) = s′(y). Conversely, if x is independent of
every variable, it is clearly constant, for it would have to be independent of itself,
too. So we have
=(~x) ⇐⇒ ~x ⊥ ~x.
We can also immediately observe the symmetry of independence, because cri-
terion (9) is symmetrical in x and y. More exactly, s′′(y) = s(y) ∧ s′′(x) = s′(x)
and s′′(x) = s′(x) ∧ s′′(y) = s(y) are trivially equivalent.
Dependence atoms were governed by Armstrong’s Axioms. Independence
atoms have their own axioms introduced in the context of random variables in [9]:
Definition 5. The following rules are the Independence Axioms
1. ~x ⊥ ∅ (Empty Set Rule)
2. If ~x ⊥ ~y, then ~y ⊥ ~x (Symmetry Rule).
3. If ~x ⊥ ~y~z, then ~x ⊥ ~y (Weakening Rule).
4. If ~x ⊥ ~x, then ~x ⊥ ~y (Constancy Rule).
5. If ~x ⊥ ~y and ~x~y ⊥ ~z, then ~x ⊥ ~y~z (Exchange Rule).
Note that xy ⊥ xy is derivable from x ⊥ x and y ⊥ y, by means of the Empty
Set Rule, the Constancy Rule and the Exchange Rule.
It may seem that independence must have much more content than what these
four axioms express, but they are actually complete in the following sense5:
Theorem 6 (Completeness of the Independence Axioms, [9]). If T is a finite set
of independence atoms of the form ~u ⊥ ~v for various ~u and ~v, then ~y ⊥ ~x follows
from T according to the above rules if and only if every team that satisfies T also
satisfies ~y ⊥ ~x.
Proof. We adapt the proof of [9] into our framework. Suppose ~x ⊥ ~y follows
semantically from Σ but does not follow by the above rules. W.l.o.g. Σ is closed
under the rules. We may assume that ~x and ~y are minimal, that is, if ~x ′ ⊆ ~x and
~y ′ ⊆ ~y and at least one containment is proper, then if ~x ′ ⊥ ~y ′ follows from Σ
semantically, it also follows by the rules. It is easy to see that if Σ |= u ⊥ u, then
Σ ⊢ u ⊥ u.
5This was originally proved for random variables in [9] and then adapted for databases in [16].
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Suppose ~x = (x1, . . . , xl) and ~y = (y1, . . . , ym). Let ~z = (z1, . . . , zk) be
the remaining variables. Wlog, l ≥ 1 and m ≥ 1, x1 ⊥ x1 /∈ Σ, and x1 /∈
{y1, . . . , ym}.
We construct a team S in a 2-element model M = {0, 1} of the empty vocab-
ulary as follows: We take to S every s : ~x~y~z →M , which satisfies s(u) = 0 for u
such that u ⊥ u ∈ Σ and in addition
s(x1) = the number of ones in s[{x2, . . . , xl, y1, . . . , ym}] mod 2
Claim 1: ~x ⊥ ~y is not true in S. Suppose otherwise. Consider the following two
assignments in S:
x1 other xi y1 other yi other
s 1 0 1 0 0
s′ 0 0 0 0 0
If s′′ is such that s′′(~x) = s(~x) and s′′(~y) = s′(~y), then s′′ /∈ S. Claim 1 is proved.
Claim 2: S satisfies all the independence atoms in Σ. Suppose ~v ⊥ ~w ∈ S. If
either ~v or ~w contains only variables in Z, then the claim is trivial, as then either
~v or ~w has in S all possible binary sequences. So let us assume that both ~v and
~w meet ~x~y. If ~v ~w does not cover all of ~x~y, then S satisfies ~v ⊥ ~w, because we
can fix parity on the variable in ~x~y which does not occur in ~v ~w. So let us assume
~v ~w covers all of ~x~y. Thus ~v = ~x ′~y ′~z ′ and ~w = ~x ′′~y ′′~z ′′, where ~x ′~x ′′ = ~x and
~y ′~y ′′ = ~y. W.l.o.g., ~x ′ 6= ∅ and ~x ′~y ′ 6= ~x~y. By minimality ~x ′ ⊥ ~y ′ ∈ Σ and
~x ′′ ⊥ ~y ∈ Σ. Since ~v ⊥ ~w ∈ Σ, a couple of applications of the Exchange and
Weakening Rules gives ~x ′~y ′ ⊥ ~x ′′~y ′′ ∈ Σ. But then ~x ′~x ′′ ⊥ ~y ′~y ′′ ∈ Σ, contrary to
assumption.
We can use the conditions (4) to extend the truth definition to the entire inde-
pendence logic, i.e. the extension of first order logic by the independence atoms.
Can we axiomatize logical consequence in independence logic? The answer is
again no, and for the same reason as for dependence logic: Recall that the sen-
tence (5) characterizes infinity and ruins any hope to have a completeness theorem
for dependence logic. We can do the same using independence atoms:
Lemma 7. The sentence
∃z∀x∃y∀u∃v(xy ⊥ uv ∧ (x = u↔ y = v) ∧ ¬v = z) (10)
is true exactly in infinite models.
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The conclusion is that the kind of dependence relation needed for expressing
infinity can be realized either by the functional dependence relation or by the
independence relation. Another such example is parity in finite models. The
following two sentences, the first one with a dependence atom and the second with
an independence atom, both express the evenness of the size of a finite model:
∀x∃y∀u∃v(=(u, v) ∧ (x = v ↔ y = u) ∧ ¬x = y)
∀x∃y∀u∃v(xy ⊥ uv ∧ (x = v ↔ y = u) ∧ ¬x = y)
The fact that we could express, at will, both infinity and evenness by means of
either dependence atoms or independence atoms, is not an accident. Dependence
logic and independence logic have overall the same expressive power:
Theorem 8. The following are equivalent:
(1) K is definable by a sentence of the extension of first order logic by the depen-
dence atoms.
(2) K is definable by a sentence of the extension of first order logic by the inde-
pendence atoms.
(3) K is definable in existential second order logic.
Proof. The equivalence of (1) and (3), a consequence of results in [5] and [25],
as observed in [15], is proved in [23]. So it suffices to show that (1) implies (2).
We give only the main idea. Sentences referred to in (1) have a normal form [23].
Here is an example of a sentence in such a normal form
∀x∀y∃v∃w(=(x, v) ∧=(y, w) ∧ φ(x, y, v, w)),
where φ(x, y, v, w) is a quantifier free first order formula. This sentence can be
expressed in terms of independence atoms as follows:
∀x∀y∃v∃w(xv⊥y ∧ yw⊥xv ∧ φ(x, y, v, w)).
Note that independence, as we have defined it, is not the negation of depen-
dence. It is rather a very strong denial of dependence. However, there are uses of
the concepts of dependence and independence where the negation of dependence
is the same as independence. An example is vector spaces.
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There is an earlier common use of the concept of independence in logic,
namely the independence of a set Σ of axioms from each other. This is usually
taken to mean that no axiom is provable from the remaining ones. By Go¨del’s
Completeness Theorem this means the same as having for each axiom φ ∈ Σ a
model of the remaining ones Σ \ {φ} in which φ is false. This is not so far from
the independence concept ~y ⊥ ~x. Again, the idea is that from the truth of Σ \ {φ}
we can say nothing about the truth-value of φ. This is the sense in which Contin-
uum Hypothesis (CH) is independent of ZFC. Knowing the ZFC axioms gives as
no clue as to the truth or falsity of CH. In a sense, our independence atom ~y ⊥ ~x
is the familiar concept of independence transferred from the world of formulas to
the world of elements of models, from truth values to variable values.
4 Conditional Independence
The independence atom ~y ⊥ ~x turns out to be a special case of the more general
atom ~y ⊥~x ~z, the intuitive meaning of which is that the variables ~y are totally
independent of the variables ~z when the variables ~x are kept fixed (see [10]).
Formally,
Definition 9. A team S satisfies the atomic formula ~y ⊥~x ~z in M if
∀s, s′ ∈ S(s(~x) = s′(~x)→ ∃s′′ ∈ S(s′′(~x~y) = s(~x~y) ∧ s′′(~z) = s′(~z))).
Some of the rules that this “conditional” independence notion obeys are
Reflexivity: ~x ⊥~x ~y;
Symmetry: If ~y ⊥~x ~z, then ~z ⊥~x ~y;
Weakening: If ~yy′ ⊥~x ~zz′, then ~y ⊥~x ~z;
First Transitivity: If ~x ⊥~z ~y and ~u ⊥~z~x ~y, then ~u ⊥~z ~y;
Second Transitivity: If ~y ⊥~z ~y and ~z~x ⊥~y ~u, then ~x ⊥~z ~u.
Exchange: If ~x ⊥~z ~y and ~x~y ⊥~z ~u, then ~x ⊥~z ~y~u.
Are these axioms complete? More in general, is it possible to find a finite, de-
cidable axiomatization for the consequence relation between conditional indepen-
dence atoms?
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The answer is negative. Indeed, in [11, 12] Hermann proved that the conse-
quence relation between conditional independence atoms is undecidable; and as
proved by Parker and Parsaye-Ghomi in [22], it is not possible to find a finite
and complete axiomatization for these atoms. However, the consequence relation
is recursively enumerable, and in [21] Naumov and Nicholls developed a proof
system for it.
The logic obtained by adding conditional independence atoms to first order
logic will be called in this paper conditional independence logic. It is clear that
it contains (nonconditional) independence logic; and furthermore, as discussed in
[10], it also contains dependence logic, since a dependence atom =(~x, ~y) can be
seen to be equivalent to ~y ⊥~x ~y. It is also easy to see that every conditional in-
dependence logic sentence is equivalent to some Σ1
1
sentence, and therefore that
conditional independence logic is equivalent to independence logic and depen-
dence logic with respect to sentences.
But this leaves open the question of whether every conditional independence
logic formula is equivalent to some independence logic one. In what follows,
building on the analysis of the expressive power of conditional independence logic
of [8],6 we prove that independence logic and conditional independence logic are
indeed equivalent.
In order to give our equivalence proof we first need to mention two other
atoms, the inclusion atom ~x ⊆ ~y and the exclusion atom ~x | ~y. These atoms cor-
respond to the database-theoretic inclusion [6, 3] and exclusion [4] dependencies,
and hold in a team if and only if no possible value for ~x is also a possible value
for ~y and if every possible value for ~x is a possible value for ~y respectively. More
formally,
Definition 10. A team S satisfies the atomic formula ~x ⊆ ~y in M if
∀s ∈ S∃s′ ∈ S(s′(~y) = s(~x))
and it satisfies the atomic formula ~x | ~y in M if
∀s, s′ ∈ S(s(~x) 6= s′(~y)).
As proved in [8],
1. Exclusion logic (that is, first order logic plus exclusion atoms) is equivalent
to dependence logic;
6In that paper, conditional independence logic is simply called “independence logic”. After
all, the two logics are equivalent.
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2. Inclusion logic (that is, first order logic plus inclusion atoms) is not compa-
rable with dependence logic, but is contained in (nonconditional) indepen-
dence logic;
3. Inclusion/exclusion logic (that is, first-order logic plus inclusion and exclu-
sion atoms) is equivalent to conditional independence logic (that is, first-
order logic plus conditional independence atoms ~y ⊥~x ~z).
Thus, if we can show that exclusion atoms can be defined in terms of (noncon-
ditional) independence atoms and of inclusion atoms, we can obtain at once that
independence logic contains conditional independence logic (and, therefore, is
equivalent to it). But this is not difficult: indeed, the exclusion atom ~x | ~y is
equivalent to the expression
∃~z(~x ⊆ ~z ∧ ~y ⊥ ~z ∧ ~y 6= ~z).
This can be verified by checking the satisfaction conditions of this formula. But
more informally speaking, the reason why this expression is equivalent to ~x | ~y is
that it states that that every possible value of ~x is also a possible value for ~z, that ~y
and ~z are independent (and therefore, any possible value of ~y must occur together
with any possible value of ~z), and that ~y is always different from ~z. Such a ~z may
exist if and only if no possible value of ~x is also a possible value of ~y, that is, if
and only if ~x | ~y holds.
Hence we may conclude at once that
Theorem 11. Every conditional independence logic formula is equivalent to some
independence logic formula.
In [8] it was also shown the following analogue of Theorem 3:
Theorem 12. Let us fix a vocabulary L and an n-ary predicate symbol S /∈ L.
Then:
• For every L-formula φ(x1, ..., xn) of conditional independence logic there
is an existential second order L ∪ {S}-sentence Φ(S) such that for all L-
structures M and all teams X:
M |=X φ(x1, ..., xn) ⇐⇒ M |= Φ(X). (11)
• For every existential second order L ∪ {S}-sentence Φ(S) there exists an
L-formula φ(x1, ..., xn) of conditional independence logic such that (11)
holds for all L-structures M and all teams X 6= ∅.
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Due to the equivalence between independence logic and conditional indepen-
dence logic, the same result holds if we only allow nonconditional independence
atoms. In particular, this implies that over finite models independence logic cap-
tures precisely the NP properties of teams.
5 Belief Representation and Belief Dynamics
Given a model M, a variable assignment s admits a natural interpretation as the
representation of a possible state of things, where, for every variable v, the value
s(v) corresponds to a specific fact concerning the world. To use the example
discussed in Chapter 7 of [7], let the elements of M correspond to the participants
to a competition: then the values of the variables x1, x2 and x3 in an assignment s
may correspond respectively to the first-, second- and the third-placed players.
With respect to the usual semantics for first order logic, a first order formula
represents a condition over assignments. For example, the formula
φ(x1, x2, x3) := (¬x1 = x2) ∧ (¬x2 = x3) ∧ (¬x1 = x3)
represents the (very reasonable) assertion according to which the winner, the
second-placed player and the third-placed player are all distinct.
Now, a team S, being a set of assignments, represents a set of states of things.
Hence, a team may be interpreted as the belief set of an agent α: s ∈ S if and
only if the agent α believes s to be possible. Moving from assignments to teams,
it is possible to associate to each formula φ and model M the family of teams
{S : M |=S φ}, and this allows us to interpret formulas as conditions over belief
sets: in our example, M |=S φ(x1, x2, x3) if and only if M |=s φ(x1, x2, x3) for all
s ∈ S, that is, if and only if our agent α believes that the winner, the second-placed
player and the third-placed player will all be distinct.
However, there is much that first order logic cannot express regarding the be-
liefs of our agent. For example, there is no way to represent the assertion that the
agent α knows who the winner of the competition will be: indeed, suppose that
a first order formula θ represents such a property, and let s1 and s2 be any two
assignments with s1(x1) 6= s2(x1), corresponding to two possible states of things
which disagree with respect to the identity of the winner. Then, for S1 = {s1}
and S2 = {s2}, we should have that M |=S1 θ and that M |=S2 θ: indeed, both
S1 and S2 correspond to belief sets in which the winner is known to α (and is
respectively s1(x1) or s2(x1)). But since a team S satisfies a first order formula if
and only if all of its assignments satisfy it, this implies that M |=S1∪S2 θ; and this
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is unacceptable, because if our agent α believes both s1 and s2 to be possible then
she does not know whether the winner will be s1(x1) or s2(x1).
How to represent this notion of knowledge? The solution, it is easy to see,
consists in adding constancy atoms to our language: indeed, M |=S= dep(x1)
if and only if for any two assignments s, s′ ∈ S we have that s(x1) = s′(x1),
that is, if and only if all states of things the agent α consider possible agree with
respect to the identity of the winner of the competition. What if, instead, our
agent could infer the identity of the winner from the identity of the second- and
third-placed participants? Then we would have that M |=S =(x2x3, x1), since
any two states of things which the agent considered possible and which agreed
with respect to the identity of the second- and third-placed participants would also
agree with respect to the identity of the winner. More in general, a dependence
atom =(~y, ~x) describes a form of conditional knowledge: M |=S =(~y, ~x) if and
only if S corresponds to the belief state of an agent who would be able to deduce
the value of ~x from the value of ~y.
On the other hand, independence atoms represent situations of informational
independence: for example, if M |=S x1 ⊥ x3 then, by learning the identity of
the third-placed player, our agent could infer nothing at all about the identity of
the winner. Indeed, suppose that, according to our agent, it is possible that A will
win (that is, there is a s ∈ S with s(x1) = A) and it is possible that B will place
third (that is, there is a s′ ∈ S such that s′(x3) = B). Then, by the satisfaction
conditions of the independence atom, there is also a s′′ ∈ S such that s′′(x1) = A
and s′′(x3) = B: in other words, it is possible that A will be the winner and B
will place third, and telling our agent that B will indeed place third will not allow
her to remove A from her list of possible winners.
Thus, it seems that dependence and independence logic, or at least fragments
thereof, may be interpreted as belief description languages. This line of investi-
gation is pursued further in [7]: here it will suffice to discuss the interpretation of
the linear implication7 φ⊸ ψ, a connective introduced in [1] whose semantics is
given by
M |=S φ⊸ ψ ⇔ for all S ′ such that M |=S′ φ it holds that M |=S∪S′ ψ.
How to understand this connective? Suppose that our agent α, whose belief
state is represented by the team S, interacts with another agent β, whose belief
7The name “linear implication” is due to the similarity between the satisfaction conditions of
this connective and the ones of the implication of linear logic. Another similarity is the following
Galois connection: θ |= φ⊸ ψ ⇐⇒ θ ∨ φ |= ψ [1].
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state is represented by the team S ′: one natural outcome of this interaction may be
represented by the team S ∪S ′, corresponding to the set of all states of things that
α or β consider possible. Then stating that a team S satisfies φ⊸ ψ corresponds
to asserting that whenever our agent α interacts with another agent β whose belief
state satisfies φ, the result of the interaction will be a belief state satisfying ψ:
in other words, using the linear implication connective allows us to formulate
predictions concerning the future evolution of the belief state of our agent.
One can, of course, consider other forms of interactions between agents and
further connectives; and quantifiers can also be given natural interpretations in
terms of belief updates (the universal quantifier ∀v, for example, can be un-
derstood in terms of the agent α doubting her beliefs about v). But what we
want to emphasize here, beyond the interpretations of the specific connectives,
is that team-based semantics offers a very general and powerful framework for
the representation of beliefs and belief updates, and that notions of dependence
and independence arise naturally under such an interpretation. This opens up
some fascinating – and, so far, relatively unexplored – avenues of research, such
as for example a more in-depth investigation of the relationship between depen-
dence/independence logic and dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) and other logics of
knowledge and belief; and, furthermore, it suggests that epistemic and doxastic
ideas may offer some useful inspiration for the formulation and analysis of further
notions of dependence and independence.
6 Concluding remarks
We hope to have demonstrated that both dependence and independence can be
given a logical analysis by moving in semantics from single states s to plural
states S. Future work will perhaps show that allowing limited transitions from
one plural state to another may lead to decidability results concerning dependence
and independence logic, a suggestion of Johan van Benthem.
Furthermore, we proved the equivalence between conditional independence
logic and independence logic, thus giving a novel contribution to the problem of
characterizing the relations between extensions of dependence logic.
Finally, we discussed how team-based semantics may be understood as a very
general framework for the representation of beliefs and belief updates and how
notions of dependence and independence may be understood under this interpre-
tation. This suggests the existence of intriguing connections between dependence
and independence logic and other formalisms for belief knowledge representation,
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as well as a possible application for this fascinating family of logics.
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